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The local sourcing of intermediate products is one the main channels for foreign direct investment (FDI)
spillovers. This paper investigates whether and how participation and positioning in the global value
chains (GVCs) of host countries is associated to local sourcing by foreign investors. Matching two firm-
level data sets on 19 Sub-Saharan African countries and Vietnam to country-sector level measures of
GVC involvement, we find that more intense GVC participation and upstream specialization are associ-
ated to a higher share of inputs sourced locally by foreign investors. These effects are larger in countries
with stronger rule of law and better education.
 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Since 2000, many developing countries have experienced an
upsurge of foreign capital inflows accompanied by increasing par-
ticipation in the process of global production fragmentation.
Between 2001 and 2016, developing economies were the main
beneficiaries of the rise in worldwide foreign direct investments
(FDIs), on average receiving more than twice the amount invested
in advanced economies (UNCTAD, 2017). Moreover, their participa-
tion in global value chains (GVCs) has allowed many developing
country firms to become full and qualified participants in the glo-
bal market by specializing in specific stages of the production pro-
cess. These firms have exploited their comparative advantages
without having to develop all the capabilities encompassed by
the value chain (Taglioni and Winkler, 2016). The opportunity to
become part of the production process through participation in
one or a few specific stages is of particular relevance for many
Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries which have a limited manu-
facturing base but for which internationalization through GVC
involvement can be a ‘‘golden opportunity” (IMF, 2015: 56).FDI represents an important source of development finance, and
contributes to domestic employment, capital formation, and access
to key external knowledge for the local economies in developing
countries (Hanousek, Kocenda, & Maurel, 2011). Since the pioneer-
ing work by Caves (1974), the effect of FDI spillovers on local eco-
nomic development in recipient countries has been thoroughly
investigated with mixed results (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007;
Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Rojec and Knell, 2017). This has led
to some scholars focusing on the channels through which domestic
firms can benefit from such spillovers, and the factors influencing
their existence, sign, and magnitude (Farole and Winkler, 2014;
Irsova and Havranek, 2013). Among the channels investigated,
local sourcing of inputs and intermediate products by foreign
investors is considered an important potential source of FDI spil-
lovers based on demand for local supply of more and better inputs
to satisfy the global market, and assistance that foreign firms can
offer to their local providers (Giroud, Jindra, & Marek, 2012;
Jordaan, 2017; Newman, Rand, Talbot, & Tarp, 2015; Rodriguez-
Clare, 1996).
This article contributes to the literature on local sourcing by for-
eign investors by proposing a novel determinant: the host coun-
try’s involvement in GVCs. We measure GVC participation by
examining the importance of global production chains in country
(and sector) exports and assess the GVC position based on country
(and sector) specialization in the upstream (i.e. production of inter-
mediates used by other countries) and downstream (i.e. use of
intermediates produced by other countries to manufacture final
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GVCs exposes local firms to the requirements of international mar-
kets and more sophisticated demand, and to learning opportunities
through the transfer of knowledge and technology from global
leaders to local suppliers within the value chain. In addition,
upstream participation in GVCs implies local specialization in the
production of intermediate inputs available for foreign investors
to purchase. Conversely, in developing countries downstream spe-
cialization frequently corresponds to concentration in the assem-
bly phase of imported inputs, exploiting mainly low-cost local
labor force, with no direct impact on the local supply of intermedi-
ate inputs.
In the empirical analysis, GVC indicators are calculated from
internationally comparable input/output (I/O) tables retrieved
from the Eora Multi Region Input-Output (MRIO) database
(Lenzen, Kanemoto, Moran, & Geschke, 2012) and computed at
the country-sector pair level. Two firm-level data sets—the Africa
Investor Survey (AIS) on 19 SSA countries, and the Vietnam Inves-
tor Survey (VIS) both administrated by UNIDO—provide detailed
information on foreign investors’ choices concerning local sourcing
and the transfer of knowledge and other key resources to local sup-
pliers. Due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, we control for
confounding factors using firm-level characteristics and include a
set of fixed effects to absorb unobserved heterogeneity at the
country and sector levels. In our preferred specification, we control
also for more granular host country-industry fixed effects and esti-
mate the differential effect of GVC involvement across firm
characteristics.
A joint analysis of SSA countries and Vietnam is particularly
pertinent in the context of our research since it allows us to inves-
tigate a region that attracts relatively fewer foreign manufacturing
investments and a country that recently has assumed a central
position in the rapidly expanding process of global fragmentation
of production. Although between 2005 and 2015 the contribution
of FDI to African development increased by 9.6 times on average,
it remains marginal (UNCTAD, 2017). Infrastructure gaps, political
instability, and relatively low levels of industrialization and eco-
nomic diversification deter FDI (World Bank, 2015) and GVC partic-
ipation (OECD and AfDB, 2014; IMF, 2015). In contrast, since the
mid 1990s Vietnam has encouraged the entry of foreign capital,
the establishment of joint ventures with local firms (especially
SOEs), also introducing local content requirements in some sectors
(e.g. motor-bike), then phased out in more recent years, as a result
attracting large FDI inflows based mainly on efficiency seeking
motivations. These investments represent a large share of Viet-
nam’s output (roughly 20 percent of GDP) and half of its total
exports (UNIDO, 2012b). Thanks to its strong GVC involvement,
Vietnam has emerged as one of Asia’s manufacturing powerhouses
(Hollweg et al., 2017).
Including Vietnam in the analysis strengthens the general rele-
vance of our empirical findings beyond the SSA context. Our anal-
ysis shows that the degree and type of involvement of developing
countries in GVCs are positively related to the amount of local
sourcing of intermediate products by foreign investors. Also, for-
eign investors in countries and sectors with heavy involvement
in GVCs are more likely to source their inputs locally. This includes
countries specialized in more upstream stages in the GVC where
higher local sourcing is accompanied by a higher likelihood that
local suppliers will receive support from their foreign buyers. Fur-
thermore, the relationship between GVC involvement and local
sourcing is stronger in countries with stronger rule of law and
higher spending on education.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
a discussion of the literature on FDI spillovers and GVCs. Section 3
presents some descriptive evidence of GVC involvement andinvestors’ characteristics and describes the empirical framework.
Section 4 discusses the main results and Section 5 concludes.2. FDI, local sourcing and GVC involvement
2.1. FDI spillovers and backward linkages
The large empirical literature on the link between FDI and local
economic development in recipient countries does not achieve
consensus because it tries to measure the impact of aggregate spil-
lovers (for reviews see Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Crespo and
Fontoura, 2007; Rojec and Knell, 2017). Therefore, more recently,
the literature has focused instead on the channels that facilitate
such spillovers, and their determinants (Crespo and Fontoura,
2007).
Research based on detailed firm-level data shows that spil-
lovers are more likely when a direct backward linkage between
the foreign and the domestic firm has been established
(Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2009; Jordaan, 2017; Newman et al.,
2015; Rojec and Knell, 2017). Direct relationships with foreign
firms generate both static and dynamic effects on local firms
(Blomström and Kokko, 1998; Jordaan, 2011b), relying on two
connected mechanisms: the demand and the assistance effects
(Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Giroud et al., 2012; Farole and Winkler,
2014) The former refers to increased demand for specific interme-
diate products, quality improvements, and increased variety of
local supply since foreign investors expect their local suppliers
to satisfy the requirements of global markets. The latter is the
result of the intentional transfer of knowledge and technological
and managerial capabilities by multinationals to assist local sup-
pliers in order to ensure that their requirements are met (Giroud
and Scott-Kennel, 2009). Foreign investors can contribute also by
providing training for the local labor force, offering local suppliers
advance payments, and in some cases, helping them to obtain
international certifications.
Several factors can facilitate the establishment of backward
linkages and the provision of support to domestic suppliers by for-
eign firms (Potter, Moore, & Spires, 2003). Some foreign investor’s
characteristics influence the opportunities for local sourcing.
Greater participation in the domestic company and a high level
of managerial autonomy from the parent firm facilitate access to
information about what is available locally, the quality of domestic
inputs, and the reliability of local suppliers (Amendolagine, Boly,
Coniglio, Prota, & Seric, 2013; Giroud et al., 2012). Previous invest-
ment experience in the host country can enhance the accumulated
knowledge about the local context, thereby encouraging the pur-
chase of local inputs (Jordaan, 2011a, 2017). In general, the inten-
sity of local sourcing depends on the foreign investor’s global
production strategy (Farole and Winkler, 2014). The opportunities
for local providers might be limited if the foreign company chooses
to internalize its production or to source from the same global net-
work of established suppliers (Paus and Gallagher, 2008; Belderbos
et al., 2001). A global sourcing strategy that penalizes local suppli-
ers is more common in industries such as electronics, automotive,
and pharmaceuticals where inputs are technologically complex.
Also, the motivation for investing can have an impact on the oppor-
tunities for local sourcing (Giroud et al., 2012). In the manufactur-
ing industry in developing countries, efficiency and market seeking
motivations offer more opportunities for local sourcing compared
to resource seeking investments in a primary industry that often
is concentrated in enclaves isolated from the rest of the domestic
economy (Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2004).
Also, some host country characteristics affect local sourcing.
Sound local institutions reduce problems related to contract
V. Amendolagine et al. /World Development 113 (2019) 73–88 75enforceability, while cumbersome regulations can discourage
foreign investors from purchasing local intermediate products
(Alfaro, Areendam, Sebnem, & Selin, 2004; Hsiao and Shen, 2003).
In addition, the level of human capital affects local production
capabilities and the absorptive capacity of domestic companies
which influences their ability to satisfy the more sophisticated
demand from foreign investors (Borensztein, De Gregorio, & Lee,
1998; Irsova and Havranek, 2013).
Once a linkage is established, foreign investors are likely to pro-
vide support to their local suppliers as shown by empirical evi-
dence on Mexico (Jordaan, 2011b, 2017). However, this support
on its own does not guarantee that the linkage will have positive
spillovers. These effects depend also on the duration of the relation
and contract specifications, the technological gap, and the domes-
tic firm’s absorptive capacity (Giroud and Scott-Kennel, 2009;
Jordaan, 2017).1 For instance, in the case of Lesotho, the strong attraction of foreign assembly
plants (mostly for Asian investors) in the apparel GVC is explained by the opportunity
for foreign investors to take advantage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA), and secure preferential access to the US market (Morris and Staritz, 2016).
2 For a detailed description of the surveys see Africa Investor Report (UNIDO,
2012a) and Vietnam Industrial Investment Report (UNIDO, 2012b). Both surveys
follow a rigorous methodology in terms of stratified sampling (on 3 dimensions:
sector, size and ownership) and interview techniques (face-to-face interviews with
top-level managers of foreign- and domestic-owned firms). Notwithstanding the
similarities between the two surveys, the merging of the two datasets required some
manual harmonization. Additional information is available from the UNIDO Invest-
ment Monitoring Platform at http://investment.unido.org/imp/.
3 We include ISIC revision 3 categories C and exclude industries such as
construction and utilities (together representing 40percent of the observations)
which are less likely to participate in GVCs. The majority of foreign investors are
specialized in 3 sectors: Petroleum and Chemical Products (24.5 percent), particularly
in Ghana, Mali, Malawi, and Nigeria; Textiles and Wearing Apparel (16.5 percent),
attracting FDI in Vietnam as well as in several SSA countries including Lesotho and
Madagascar where it represents the large majority of investments (respectively 72.9
percent and 57.4 percent of total investments); and Food and Beverage (14.7 percent)
especially in Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia.
4 In both surveys, each investor corresponds to the initial investment in the
country. Vietnam is overrepresented in the dataset; we deal with this by adding
destination-country fixed effects to the econometric analysis. Also, our results remain
robust to the exclusion of Vietnam (see Section 4).2.2. Local sourcing and GVC involvement
Involvement in GVCs is another dimension that might affect the
local sourcing decision (Taglioni and Winkler, 2016). Some studies
show that higher involvement in GVCs (through both higher
imports and exports of intermediate inputs) can improve the capa-
bilities of local firms, since it exposes them to stronger competi-
tion, more intense information flows, and greater production
complexity (Paus and Gallagher, 2008; Farole and Winkler,
2014). Both specialized suppliers and providers of labor intensive
inputs can take advantage of GVC-related interactions to master
new capabilities and comply with international quality standards.
Some of these mechanisms have been investigated in depth in case
studies, such as in Ivarsson and Alvstam’s (2011) study on IKEA’s
value chain in Asia which provides evidence about how local sup-
pliers learn and upgrade within the value chain. Furthermore, two
recent econometric studies on representative samples of North
African and Latin American firms do also find evidence of a produc-
tivity advantage of GVC suppliers (especially in upstream stages)
(Del Prete, Giovannetti, & Marvasi, 2017; Montalbano, Nenci, &
Pietrobelli, 2017).
Nonetheless, the extant GVC literature shows that global value
chain involvement has heterogeneous, complex implications for
the local economy (Gereffi, 1999; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002).
The patterns of governance in the GVC are important for shaping
its effects on local suppliers, and coordination may occur through
market, hierarchy, modular, relational, and captive relationships
(Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005). Pietrobelli and Rabellotti
(2011) show that different governance patterns have diverse
effects on the learning mechanisms in GVCs, offering different
potential upgrading opportunities to local suppliers. For instance,
in modular chains, learning can be the result of pressure to match
international standards while in relational GVCs, it may be mutual
and based on intense face-to-face interactions among value chain
actors with complementary competences. In captive chains, the
opportunities for learning and upgrading are generally limited to
a narrow range of tasks such as simple assembly. In these cases,
GVCs can be a barrier to spillovers if the country’s involvement is
based mostly on exploiting unskilled, low-cost labor or natural
resources, or standardized tasks with few upgrading opportunities
(Gereffi et al., 2005).
Furthermore, macroeconomic factors such as a well-functioning
business and institutional climate, and an educated and skilled
labor force might constitute tipping points in lead firms’ strategic
decisions and might influence the way countries participate in
GVCs (Antràs and Chor 2013; Cattaneo et al., 2013). Also, the exis-
tence of international trade agreements affects local GVC involve-
ment. For instance, in the case of preferential trade agreements,GVC involvement can result in low levels of upgrading and linkages
to local actors (Morris and Staritz, 2016).1
Bearing in mind the complexity involved in the impact of GVCs
on the local economy, in this paper among the determinants of
local sourcing we include two indicators of GVC involvement to
measure the participation rate and the position at the country/sec-
tor level. Although we acknowledge that these indicators do not
fully account for all the micro and macro factors characterizing
GVC involvement, they offer an aggregate quantitative assessment
which is a starting point for an appreciation of an empirical phe-
nomenon so far overlooked in the empirical literature on FDIs
and local sourcing.3. Data and empirical analysis
3.1. Foreign investments in SSA and Vietnam
We use firm-level data from two original surveys administered
by UNIDO: the African Investor Survey (AIS) on 19 Sub-Saharan
countries, and the Vietnam Investment Survey (VIS).2 They provide
detailed information on the general characteristics of foreign inves-
tors including ownership structure, country of origin, motivation for
investing, linkages, and assistance provided to local producers.
In line with other empirical studies on local sourcing, we focus
on the manufacturing industry (Belderbos, Capannelli, & Fukao,
2001; Kiyota, Matsuura, Urata, & Wei, 2008; Görg, Hanley, &
Strobl, 2011; Giroud et al., 2012; Amendolagine et al., 2013).3
The total sample includes 1915 foreign investors, 42 percent of
which are based in Vietnam.4 Among SSA countries, Kenya (10.1 per-
cent), Uganda (7.2 percent), Nigeria (5.6 percent) and Ghana (4.9
percent) are the most represented in the sample (Table A1 in the
Appendix).
The average share of inputs sourced domestically by foreign
investors is highly heterogeneous across countries and sectors
(Table 1). Countries with larger shares of local sourcing are Kenya
(43 percent), Zambia (25 percent), Tanzania and Ethiopia (23 per-
cent), Uganda and Nigeria (21 percent). In Vietnam, the average
share of local sourcing is 18 percent. Considering the average val-
ues in different industries, there are significant heterogeneities
across countries. For instance, in Ethiopia, foreign investors buy
62percent of their inputs in the local market in labor intensive
industries such as Food and Beverage, and 32 percent in Textile
and Apparel. High shares of local sourcing in Textiles occur also
Table 1



















Burkina Faso 0.11 0.33 0.00 NA 0.00 0.07 NA NA 0.00
Burundi 0.11 0.20 NA 0.00 0.00 0.20 NA NA NA
Cameroon 0.21 0.15 NA 0.25 0.27 0.33 0.00 0.30 0.11
Cape Verde 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.33 0.18 0.00 NA NA 0.00
Ethiopia 0.23 0.62 0.32 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.00 NA 0.24
Ghana 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.29 0.02 0.11 0.00 NA 0.23
Kenya 0.43 0.4 0.39 0.60 0.41 0.64 0.46 0.30 0.39
Lesotho 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.50 0.14 NA 0.05 NA 0.00
Madagascar 0.17 0.54 0.09 0.30 0.20 NA NA 0.00 0.00
Malawi 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.14 0.25 0.00 0.30 0.00
Mali 0.07 0.00 0.17 NA 0.10 0.00 0.07 NA 0.00
Mozambique 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.34 0.04 0.02 0.12 NA 0.50
Niger 0.12 0.00 NA 0.05 0.20 0.30 NA NA 0.00
Nigeria 0.21 0.28 0.38 0.39 0.19 0.15 0.08 0.03 0.05
Rwanda 0.04 0.01 0.00 NA 0.00 0.25 0.00 NA 0.00
Senegal 0.12 0.15 0.00 0.35 0.11 0.00 NA 0.00 NA
Tanzania 0.23 0.28 0.21 0.25 0.23 0.17 0.32 0.00 0.20
Uganda 0.21 0.23 0.29 0.21 0.17 0.36 0.18 0.13 0.04
Vietnam 0.18 0.25 0.18 0.24 0.19 0.13 0.11 0.17 0.22
Zambia 0.25 0.30 0.00 0.23 0.24 0.30. 0.00 NA 0.33
Source: AIS and VIS.
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Lesotho and Madagascar report shares of local sourcing below 10
percent since they are assembly platforms for Asian multinationals
exporting to the US market under the AGOA (African Growth and
Opportunity Act) preferential treatments (Morris and Staritz,
2016).
Table 2 presents a summary of the main characteristics of for-
eign investors reported as average values at country level. In
almost all countries, the share of foreign ownership is generally
well above 50 percent and most investments are greenfield. There
are some cross-country differences in the motivations for invest-
ment; although most are market seeking, in Vietnam, Lesotho,
andMadagascar efficiency seeking is an important reason to invest.3.2. Measuring participation and position in the GVC
We calculate two indicators of GVC participation and position,
based on the Eora MRIO database, which provides information on
value added trade for 189 countries and 26 sectors from 1990 to
2012 (Lenzen et al., 2012).5
The objective is to measure the interconnections across coun-
tries within a vertical trading chain where each country specializes
in some stages of the production process. For vertical international
trade to occur, a good must be produced in two or more sequential
stages, and across at least two international borders (Hummels,
Ishii, & Yei, 2001). The participation in vertically specialized trade
can take two different forms: downstream, with direct exports of
foreign value added, and upstream, with indirect exports of domes-
tic value added through a third country. Koopman et al. (2011)
decompose gross exports into two main components: 1) foreign
value-added (FVA) content of intermediate imports embodied in
gross exports, and 2) domestic value added which is the value of
domestically produced exports. The latter is further decomposed
into: a) direct domestic value added—i.e. the value added embod-
ied in exports of final goods and intermediates, absorbed by direct
importers; b) indirect domestic value added (IVA)—i.e. the value
added embodied in intermediates re-exported to third countries;5 Eora is the only IO database that provides information on SSA countries; thus,
despite some well-known concerns about missing data filled through optimization
procedures, following OECD and AfDB (2014) and IMF (2015) we use it to measure
GVC involvement in the region.and c) re-imported domestic value added—i.e. the value added
from exported intermediates that are reimported. Building on
these widely adopted definitions, we introduce two indicators of
GVC participation and position to account for GVC involvement.
3.2.1. GVC participation
We define GVC participation of each sector j in a given country n
in the cross-national trade of intermediate goods as:
GVC PARTICIPATIONjn ¼ FVAjn þ IVAjn; ð1Þ
where FVAjn is the foreign value added and IVAjn is the indirect
domestic value added in both sector j and country n, divided by
total country exports. Larger values of the index indicate more
intensive participation in the GVC.
Fig. 1 depicts average GVC participation levels and shows that
the countries with the highest levels of participation are Rwanda,
Lesotho, Vietnam, and Ethiopia where at least 60 percent of
exported value added consists of intermediates either imported
by other countries or exploited by foreign countries in their
exports. Absolute values of foreign and indirect value added are
much smaller in SSA countries compared to Vietnam, confirming
that the SSA countries generally are at the beginning of their pro-
cess of integration into GVCs. For instance, while Ethiopia and Viet-
nam report similar relative levels of participation, total valued
added of intermediates exported from Vietnam (equal to US$14.6
billion) is 16 times larger than total value added for Ethiopia (US
$900 million).
Fig. A1 (in the Appendix) reports the levels of GVC participation
in the six countries with the highest GVC involvement in each sec-
tor. Textile and Apparel is the industry with the highest GVC par-
ticipation in Lesotho, Vietnam and Ethiopia. Other industries
with important GVC participation are Food and Beverages in Sene-
gal, Vietnam and Kenya, Wood and Paper in Ghana and Cameroon,
and Chemicals in Niger.
3.2.2. GVC position
The second indicator measures the relative position of sector j
in country n within the GVCs, calculated as the log-difference
between the upstream (IVA) and the downstream components
(FVA) of the GVC participation index:
GVC POSITIONjn ¼ Lnð1þ IVAjnÞ  Lnð1þ FVAjnÞ ð2Þ
Table 2
Main characteristics of foreign investors.
Host country % of foreign
ownership
Top two origin countries with more









Number of years since the
first investment
Burundi 82.8 Belgium, Rwanda, Netherlands (2) 53.8 7.7 15.4 84.6 28.9
Cameroon 69.3 France (16), Switzerland (5) 67.5 10.0 10.0 87.5 26.6
Cape Verde 85.1 Portugal (12), Spain (4) 59.1 13.6 0.0 71.4 9.7
Ethiopia 82.2 India (11), China (9) 66.3 3.6 12.0 89.2 9.0
Ghana 85.0 India (18), UK (14) 75.3 6.4 6.4 87.2 16.9
Kenya 77.4 UK (60), India (46) 80.1 3.0 4.0 92.5 24.1
Lesotho 98.0 South Africa (17), China (14) 33.3 33.3 2.1 91.7 9.4
Madagascar 89.7 France (18), Mauritius (16) 33.3 27.1 6.2 83.0 15.8
Malawi 63.3 India, South Africa (3) 73.7 0.0 5.3 73.7 19.0
Mali 86.7 France (7), Senegal (6) 80.0 3.3 3.3 82.8 13.7
Mozambique 86.1 Portugal (27), South Africa (17) 90.8 1.5 0.0 90.6 18.4
Niger 78.7 Ghana (2) 50.0 0.0 0.0 88.9 14.7
Nigeria 60.6 India (20), Lebanon (14) 71.6 2.7 0.9 88.7 29.3
Rwanda 86.6 Kenya (6), Belgium (3) 83.3 4.2 0.0 91.7 11.1
Senegal 72.5 France (8), Lebanon, Cote d’Ivoire (3) 66.7 8.3 4.2 92.3 33.0
Tanzania 81.8 India (25), Kenya (10) 72.5 7.7 4.4 72.5 12.7
Uganda 93.8 India (48), Kenya (37) 64.2 10.2 14.6 86.1 16.1
Vietnam 96.5 China (162), Japan (150) 41.7 43.8 2.4 87.3 9.0
Zambia 86.1 South Africa, India (6) 76.3 7.9 10.5 68.4 14.8
Source: AIS and VIS.











































Fig. 1. GVC participation at country level (2010). Notes: The dotted line represents the average value in developing countries defined by the World Bank as low income and
lower-middle income. Zambia is excluded because of lack of data. Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the Eora Multi Region Input-Output database.
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phases of the production process which are remote from final
demand (e.g. production of intermediates products used by other
countries in their exports); negative values denote downstream
specialization in phases close to final demand (e.g. use of interme-
diates to produce final goods for exports).
Fig. 2 depicts the values of the GVC position index across coun-
tries. In general, SSA countries are concentrated in upstream activ-
ities, confirming their specialization in manufacturing activities
linked to the primary sector which is dominant in many of these
countries. Moreover, in many cases their level of GVC participation
is relatively low which contrasts with countries such as Ethiopia,
Lesotho, and Vietnam that generally are characterized by more
downstream positions and relatively high levels of participation.For each sector, Fig. A2 in the Appendix reports the GVC posi-
tions for the three most downstream (on the left side) and
upstream (on the right side) countries. Overall, the sectors charac-
terized by an upstream GVC position are Wood and Paper, Chemi-
cals, and Metal Products. Textile and Apparel and Food and
Beverages, two industries characterized by long chains including
transformation and assembly of intermediate products, are more
downstream in terms of GVC participation.
3.3. Empirical framework
To assess whether and how GVC participation and position are
associated to the amounts of inputs bought locally by foreign










































Fig. 2. GVC position at country level (2010). Notes: The dotted line represents the average value in developing countries defined by the World Bank as low income and the
lower-middle income. Zambia is excluded because of lack of data. Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the Eora Multi Region Input-Output database.
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of GVC involvement:
Yijn ¼ GVC PARTICIPATIONjn þ GVC POSITIONjn þ
X
Xijn þ dx
þ kn þ cj þ ei ð3Þ
The dependent variable Yijn measures local sourcing intensity as
the share of inputs sourced domestically by the foreign investor i in
industry j and country n. Following other studies on the determi-
nants of linkages (Jordaan, 2011a, 2011b; Amendolagine et al.,
2013; Belderbos et al., 2001; Kiyota et al., 2008; Giroud et al.,
2012), the set of control variables (Xijn) includes investor and
investment characteristics: a) local experience of foreign firms,
measured as the log of years since the first investment (AGE); b)
foreign share in the ownership of investors (FOREIGN OWNERSHIP);
c) investor size measured by the log of the number of employees
(SIZE); d) labor productivity measured as the log of sales on
employees (LABOR PRODUCTIVITY); e) a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if the foreign investor exports and zero otherwise
(EXPORT); f) a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the invest-
ment is greenfield and zero if it is an acquisition (GREENFIELD); and
g) a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the main reason for
investing is market-seeking and zero for any other reason (MART-
KET SEEKING).6
To absorb unobserved heterogeneity which could affect both
the degree of GVC participation and the firm’s propensity to under-
take local sourcing, we include fixed effects for the origin and des-
tination countries of the foreign investor i (dx and kn, respectively)
and for the destination industry j (cj). Also, as well as including
fixed effects for the origin and destination countries, as a robust-6 Other factors, such as the share of skilled workers and the technological
capabilities of foreign firms which previous studies have found to be important
drivers of local linkages (Joordan, 2011a; Giroud et al., 2012; Sánchez-Martín, De
Piniés, and Antoine, 2015) could contribute to explaining the size of the linkages.
However, data availability prevents us from including these variables. Definitions,
sources, and summary statistics of all the variables are presented in Table A2 in the
Appendix.ness check we test in the Appendix A1 whether geographic, cul-
tural, and institutional proximity between the investment origin
and destination countries matters for explaining local sourcing.7
Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, the results cannot
be interpreted in a causal way since we cannot exclude potential
endogeneity of GVC participation. While reverse causality is unli-
kely to be an issue given the matching at the firm-sector level
(i.e. we can reasonably exclude that the performance of a single
firm could affect the degree of GVC involvement of the whole sec-
tor),8 endogeneity could still arise if unobserved factors were corre-
lated to firm propensity to source locally and to the sector degree of
GVC involvement. The standard fixed effects included in Eq. (3) con-
trol for only some of these factors; there may still be unobserved fac-
tors at the country-sector level (e.g. industrial policy, technology)
driving both local sourcing and GVC participation. To partially
address these concerns, when looking at firm–level heterogeneity
we estimate the differential effect of GVC involvement across firm
characteristics, controlling also for more granular host country-
industry fixed effects to minimize omitted variable bias. Standard
errors are clustered at the destination country-industry pair level
to allow for serial correlation among investments in the same indus-
try and the same country.4. Discussion of the main findings
4.1. Local sourcing of intermediate inputs
Table 3 reports the marginal effects of the Tobit estimation of
Eq. (3) and shows the presence of a positive and statistically signif-
icant relation between the extent of local sourcing from foreign
investors and participation and position in GVCs.
The marginal effects reported in column 1 indicate that moving
from a very low level of GVC participation in a country such as Mali7 We thank the editor and one of the referees for this suggestion.
8 To further rule out issues related to reverse causality, as a robustness test, we ran
our main regressions using 3 and 5-year lags of the variables of interest. The results
(available upon request) did not change.
Table 3
Global value chains, local sourcing and support to local suppliers.
Dependent variable LOCAL SOURCING ANY SUPPORT TECHNICAL SUPPORT
Sample SSA & Vietnam SSA SSA & Vietnam
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GVC PARTICIPATION 1.204*** 0.300* 0.800 0.829
(0.133) (0.177) (1.051) (0.978)
GVC POSITION 1.288*** 1.077*** 1.948* 1.728*
(0.083) (0.143) (1.018) (0.893)
AGE 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.039 0.049
(0.002) (0.004) (0.033) (0.034)
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP 0.077*** 0.069*** 0.126 0.111
(0.002) (0.003) (0.080) (0.077)
SIZE 0.018*** 0.026*** 0.048** 0.038*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.023) (0.021)
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.027** 0.020*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.011)
EXPORT 0.016*** 0.045*** 0.068 0.069
(0.004) (0.011) (0.053) (0.054)
GREENFIELD 0.005 0.013*** 0.014 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.047) (0.048)
MARKET SEEKING 0.013*** 0.036*** 0.097*** 0.095***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.027) (0.028)
LOCAL SOURCING 0.365** 0.362**
(0.186) (0.157)
LOCAL SOURCING2 0.397** 0.357**
(0.198) (0.176)
Origin Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1655 923 978 978
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the marginal coefficients of Eq. (3), obtained with a Tobit estimator. The dependent variable is the share of inputs sourced domestically by
foreign investors (LOCAL SOURCING). Columns 3 and 4 report the marginal coefficient of the probit models in which the dependent variables are dummies equal to 1 if the
foreign investor provided, respectively, any form (ANY SUPPORT) or some particular support (TECHNICAL SUPPORT) to local suppliers, and zero otherwise. Results reported in
columns 1, 3, and 4 refer to the full sample; results in column 2 refer to the sub-sample of SSA countries. The definitions of all the explanatory variables are provided in
Appendix Table A2. Robust standard errors clustered by investment destination country-industry pair, are reported in parentheses * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01.
9 The Ahafo Linkage Program was established in Ghana in 2007 by Newmont and
the International Financial Corporation with the objective of promoting the involve-
ment of local firms in the supply chain of foreign investors in gold mining where
Ghana has an upstream specialization (Farole and Winkler, 2014). Following the
discovery of gas reserves, the Government of Tanzania established local content units
with the objective of fostering the involvement of domestic firms as suppliers of
foreign multinationals investing in Tanzania.
10 In order to check whether the sample composition matters for the estimated
effects, we estimated Eq. (3) dropping one destination country at the time and
plotting the coefficients of the GVC participation and position variables in Fig. A3 in
the Appendix. Our results are robust to this exercise.
11 As a robustness check, we decomposed the index to measure downstream (FVA)
and upstream (IVA) GVC participation. The results are reported in Appendix Table A4
which replicates the models presented in Table 3 with the two GVC participation
components. We find that the amount of local sourcing is significantly and positively
related to both the foreign and the domestic components of GVC participation, and
the magnitude of the coefficients changes only slightly.
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the share of intermediate products bought locally increases by
6.4 percentage points, a quite significant change considering that
the average share of local sourcing is around 20 percent. Evidence
for SSA countries and Vietnam reported in Farole and Winkler
(2014) confirms that GVC involvement fosters the development
of a local supply base e.g. in the mining industry (i.e. in Ghana)
and the agro-food buyer-driven chain (in Vietnam, Kenya, and
Mozambique). Note also that, confirming the complexity of the
relationship between GVC participation and local sourcing,
Taglioni and Winkler (2016) show that in similar industries, con-
text specific conditions and different governance patterns may
explain heterogeneous effects. For instance, in the food sector,
the findings from a survey of foreign multinationals in Ghana,
Kenya, Mozambique, and Vietnam suggest that linkages to local
suppliers are much higher in Vietnam (76 percent) than in African
countries (50 percent or less), and that Vietnamese suppliers enjoy
higher spillover effects than their African counterparts (Taglioni
and Winkler, 2016), notwithstanding similar levels of GVC involve-
ment (see Fig. A1 in the Appendix).
Our results also show that countries and industries with
upstream specialization in phases of the production process far
from the final demand such as production of intermediate products
used in exports by other countries, report higher shares of local
sourcing from foreign investors. The more upstream the industry,
the more it produces intermediate goods that can be bought by for-
eign investors. This result is particularly relevant to SSA countries,
whose involvement in GVCs so far has been confined to export of
primary inputs or basic manufacturing products which are trans-
formed elsewhere. While the literature on GVCs usually associates
more upstream specialization to lower value-added activities, we
show that this pattern of integration in value chains can generatethe indirect effect of opening opportunities to attract FDI with high
local content. Some experiences in upstream sectors such as the
agro-industry or mining where both FDI and greater local sourcing
of inputs by foreign firms are increasing, confirm our findings.
Examples include the gold industry Ahafo Linkage program in
Ghana reported in Farole and Winkler (2014), and the Government
of Tanzania’s local content program following the discovery of
gas.9
It should be noted that our results are not driven exclusively by
the relatively high participation of Vietnam in GVCs (column 2),10
although the coefficient of GVC participation is smaller and less pre-
cisely estimated if the sample is limited to the SSA countries. The rel-
atively low levels of GVC participation in several SSA countries might
explain the weaker but still positive relation to the share of local
sourcing.11
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The estimated coefficients of the control variables are generally
in line with the literature and confirm the importance of foreign
investors’ characteristics as mediating factors on the extent of local
sourcing (Giroud et al., 2012). Higher levels of sourcing are posi-
tively correlated to the experience of foreign investors and their
export status, consistent with the view that searching and finding
reliable local sources of inputs and establishing local linkages with
domestic firms require accumulated knowledge about the local
context (Amendolagine et al., 2013).
Foreign ownership, firm size, and labor productivity are nega-
tively associated to local sourcing. The result for foreign ownership
confirms that foreign investors with strong domestic participation
in their capital, therefore more familiar and embedded in the local
context, are more inclined to source locally (Sánchez-Martín et al.,
2015). The findings for firm size and productivity validate the ten-
dency of larger andmore productive firms to either establish global
networks of suppliers or produce their intermediate products
internally (Winkler, 2013). Finally, the negative relation between
market seeking motives and local sourcing is in line with
Winkler (2013) who shows that efficiency seeking investments
are more likely to result in higher demand for local inputs.13 This result is also robust to restricting the sample to SSA countries—see Appendix
Table A5.
144.2. Support from foreign investors and GVC involvement
Given that FDI spillovers from local sourcing depend not only on
the number of linkages established between foreign investors and
domestic suppliers but also on the provision of knowledge through
different types of assistance such as support to comply with higher
technological standards or training of local workers (Rodriguez-
Clare, 1996; Potter et al., 2003), in our empirical analysis we esti-
mate Eq. (3) introducing a dependent variable measuring whether
the foreign investor offers assistance to its local suppliers. This can
be considered a proxy for the intentional transfer of resources
(Giroud and Scott-Kennel, 2009; Giroud et al., 2012).
The AIS and VIS surveys include information on six different
forms of assistance: 1) upgrading product quality; 2) improving
access to working capital/finance/equity; 3) upgrading workforce
skills; 4) transferring technology or know-how; 5) collaborating
over product design or product development; and 6) upgrading
the efficiency of production processes. Supporting product quality
upgrading and production process efficiency are the most frequent
forms of assistance (respectively in 46.6 percent and 30.7 percent
of cases), followed by collaboration (22.8 percent), training (15.7
percent), access to capital (12.7 percent), and technology transfer
(11.6 percent). We construct a synthetic indicator that takes the
value 1 if the foreign investor provides at least one form of support
to its supplier and zero otherwise (ANY SUPPORT). In our sample, 57
percent of foreign investors offer at least one form of assistance
after establishing a linkage to a local supplier.
To test whether GVC involvement matters for the degree to
which foreign investors can provide assistance to local firms, we
run a standard probit regression on the sub-sample of investors
that do local sourcing. We consider the same set of explanatory
variables used in the baseline model and add the share of local
linkages (LOCAL SOURCING) and its squared term to check for a
potential non-linear relation between the number of linkages and
the provision of assistance (Giroud et al., 2012).12
The results are reported in Table 3, column 3. The coefficient of
GVC participation is no longer significant (though it remains12 The number of observations drops to around 61percent of the total sample since
only foreign investors that buy some of their intermediates from domestic suppliers
are included. For the model, we follow Giroud et al. (2012) and Jordaan (2011a)
adopting a similar set of variables to explain the number of linkages and the provision
of assistance to local suppliers.positive). As discussed in the previous section, higher participation
in GVCs improves the capabilities of the local supplier allowing it
to satisfy more complex demands from foreign investors. There-
fore, foreign investors buy more local inputs (Table 3 column 1)
but given the level of the local supplier’s capabilities, they do not
need to provide further assistance. What matters for the provision
of assistance is the specific stage of production that is sourced
locally.
The coefficient of GVC position remains positive and significant
because foreign investors involved in more upstream value chain
sectors are more likely to assist suppliers in the early phases of
the production process.13 Importantly, these results remain robust
to a different definition of the dependent variable which accounts
for more technical forms of assistance that combine upgrading of
product quality in production process sectors, technology transfer,
and training (TECHNICAL SUPPORT) (see column 4). This might be
explained by the fact that the risk of failing in the more upstream
stages in the production chain is higher—especially in less advanced
economies, and local suppliers require more assistance for these
activities compared to downstream activities (as predicted by the
model developed by Costinot, Vogel, & Wang, 2013). This interpreta-
tion is supported by cross-country evidence on local suppliers based
in low income countries (including Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, and Viet-
nam) which shows that producers of basic inputs in the agro-food
and textile value chains receive more support from their foreign
buyers (Farole and Winkler, 2014).
In this specification, the control variables generally have the
expected signs. We observe decreasing returns for the transfer of
resources to the local supply level. In line with Saliola and Zanfei
(2009), we find a weaker probability of assistance for higher levels
of local linkages. More local linkages may imply specialization
among local suppliers in low value-added functions, or local indus-
try reliance mainly on standardized production. Investor size mat-
ters since larger firms are likely to have more resources, and
therefore, to invest more in assisting their suppliers (Jordaan,
2011a).
4.3. Heterogeneity
As reported in Section 2, some host country and foreign investor
characteristics are likely to affect the decision to buy local inputs
and the degree of involvement in GVCs. Given that our sample
includes 20 different countries and a large variety of foreign firms,
to account for possible heterogeneity affecting our results we
interact the two measures of GVC involvement with macro and
firm-level variables (Table 4).14
At the macroeconomic level, some characteristics of the host
countries could influence the relation of interest. Based on the lit-
erature discussed in Section 2.1, two important factors that might
affect the relationship between local sourcing and GVC involve-
ment are institutional quality and human capital endowment.
The quality of local institutions, measured by the level of rule of
law (RULE LAW),15 matters especially for creating and maintaining
local linkages to domestic suppliers since well-functioning institu-
tions guarantee the enforceability of contracts with local partners
(Antràs and Chor, 2013; Dollar and Kidder, 2017). Our resultsInterpreting the estimated coefficients in the presence of multiple interactions
could be complex in the context of determining the overall effects (see Kam and
Franzese, 2009 for a discussion of the relevance of theory in the design of empirical
models).
15 Note that institutional indicators such as the one we use suffer from limitations
since they are based on subjective assessment rather than objective and easier-to-
measure indicators.
Table 4
Cross-country and firm-level heterogeneity.
Dependent variable LOCAL SOURCING Country-level heterogeneity Firm-level heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GVC PARTICIPATION 1.498*** 8.509***
(0.172) (0.597)
GVC POSITION 1.569*** 11.122***
(0.111) (0.866)
RULE LAW x GVC PARTICIPATION 0.501***
(0.057)
RULE LAW x GVC POSITION 0.451***
(0.128)
EDUCATION x GVC PARTICIPATION 0.424***
(0.034)
EDUCATION x GVC POSITION 0.532***
(0.038)
EXPORT x GVC PARTICIPATION 1.032***
(0.044)
EXPORT x GVC POSITION 0.775***
(0.082)
SIZE x GVC PARTICIPATION 0.564***
(0.032)
SIZE x GVC POSITION 0.625***
(0.045)
AGE 0.010*** 0.002 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP 0.076*** 0.106*** 0.040*** 0.041***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
EXPORT 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.007**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
GREENFIELD 0.005 0.014*** 0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
MARKET SEEKING 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Origin Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes – –
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes – –
Host Country x Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Number of observations 1.655 1.593 1.655 1.655
Notes: The table reports the marginal coefficients of Eq. (3) obtained with a Tobit estimator. The dependent variable is the share of inputs sourced domestically by foreign
investors (LOCAL SOURCING). The explanatory variables definitions are presented in Appendix Table A2. Robust standard errors, clustered by investment destination country-
industry pair, are reported in parentheses * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01.
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ment and local sourcing is stronger in countries with stronger insti-
tutions (column 1).
Moreover, the country’s human capital endowment is a neces-
sary condition for the absorption of FDI spillovers (Borensztein
et al., 1998) including those realized through linkages (Farole and
Winkler, 2014), and for entry to and upgrading in GVCs (Antràs,
Chor, Fally, & Hillberry, 2012). Taking the share of expenditure
on education in GDP (EDUCATION) as a proxy for human capital,
we find a positive and significant coefficient of the interaction with
the GVC variables (column 2).16 This supports the idea that high
education spending reinforces the positive relationship between
GVC participation/upstream position and local sourcing.
Taking account of heterogeneity at the micro level, we interact
the GVC indicators with some investor characteristics to allow for
firm-level heterogeneity in the relation between GVC involvement
and local sourcing. This strategy allows us to include more gran-
ular country-industry fixed effects to account for unobserved
factors at the host country-sector level (including e.g. industrial
policies, trade agreements, and technological changes) which16 Estimating the same model using the human capital index provided by the Penn
World Tables provides similar results.might shape the relationship between GVC and local sourcing.
In this case, we cannot estimate the local level effect of the GVC
variables but only the differential effects across firm
characteristics.
When we introduce a dummy for exporting firms, the coeffi-
cients of both interaction terms are significant and negative, indi-
cating that export-oriented foreign investors are relatively less
likely than domestic investors to buy their inputs locally if the des-
tination country/industry is involved in GVCs. This result is consis-
tent with export platform types of investment which are typical in
sectors highly integrated in GVCs such as the clothing industry
where foreign firms move to locations where it is easier (i.e.
because of trade agreements) to import and re-export parts and
components to third markets. These types of investments are often
characterized by low levels of local linkages (Farole and Winkler,
2014). For instance, some SSA countries—such as Madagascar and
Lesotho—have benefitted from trade arrangements such as AGOA
to attract export-oriented investors from Asia. Since these inves-
tors obtain most of their inputs (including fabrics) from their home
countries or globally, the degree of integration with local firms is
limited (Morris and Staritz, 2016). As a matter of facts, Vietnam
has signed preferential trade agreements with the EU and Japan
and has a number of agreements within the ASEAN countries; at
the same time, it has increased its involvement in GVCs mostly
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by the foreign investors based in the country.17 This finding sup-
ports the discussion in Hollweg et al. (2017) on how the involvement
of Vietnam in some GVCs (i.e. electronics) hampers upgrading and
diversification from low value added tasks (such as assembly), and
reduces the opportunities for links between domestic and foreign
firms.
Finally, we interact the two measures of GVC involvement with
firm size (SIZE). The coefficients of the interaction terms are
negative and significant which suggests that among larger firms
local sourcing is stronger if they produce in sectors and countries
less integrated in GVCs and focused more on downstream
activities.5. Conclusions
In this paper we explored whether involvement in GVCs is
related to the establishment of backward linkages between for-
eign and local firms. We combined data from two surveys on
the role of foreign investors in 19 SSA countries and Vietnam
with data on internationally comparable I/O tables to calculate
two indicators of GVC involvement at the country-industry level.
Our results show that greater participation in GVCs is positively
associated to higher levels of local sourcing by foreign investors.
We also demonstrate that the position in the GVC matters: spe-
cialization in more upstream stages of production is positively
correlated to higher sourcing potential by foreign investors and
a greater willingness to offer support to local suppliers. Finally,
we show that the positive relation between GVC involvement
and local sourcing is stronger in countries with higher spending
on education and stronger rule of law, and at the firm level, it
is weaker for large and export-oriented foreign investors.
These findings are especially relevant for those countries—in-
cluding most SSA countries—specialized in low-value added phases
that are positioned more upstream in GVCs. Our results corrobo-
rate recent policy efforts in some SSA countries to encourage for-
eign investors’ use of local inputs by removing constraints
related to information asymmetries and improving the quality of
the local supplier base. This applies to Ghana, Nigeria, Mozam-
bique, Ethiopia, and Rwanda which are investing more in quality
standards in order to be able to satisfy more sophisticated demand
from foreign investors in more globally integrated industries
(especially agro-food and resource processing but also apparel,
cement, and motor vehicles).18
Our study contributes to the growing literature investigating
the potential benefits of GVC involvement especially in low-
income countries (Taglioni and Winkler, 2016; Dollar and
Kidder, 2017). We propose an additional channel through which
the benefits from participation in GVCs can spread through the
local economy: attracting foreign investors to establish local
sourcing links. Greater involvement in GVCs can improve the
business ecosystem in which foreign investors decide to produce,
and enhance local capabilities, production quality, and knowledge
about foreign demand. An improved business ecosystem would
encourage foreign investors to rely more on local inputs which
would increase domestic demand and potential transmission of
positive spillovers to the domestic economic system. Our results
show a high degree of complementarity between GVCs and FDI
(UNCTAD, 2013; Farole and Winkler, 2014; Taglioni and
Winkler, 2016), and suggest that policies to support entry to17 In our sample, about 90 percent of foreign investors based in Vietnam are
exporters (in the case of SSA, this share drops to 51 percent).
18 For related evidence, see https://www.theigc.org/person/john-sutton/.and upgrading of countries in GVCs could facilitate potential spil-
lovers from FDI.
Clearly, our work is limited by the cross-sectional nature of our
data which do not allow us to fully identify the effect of GVC
involvement on local sourcing. This could be overcome in the
future if data would be available to explore it in a panel setting.
Moreover, the relation between GVC involvement, domestic sup-
pliers’ capabilities, and local sourcing from foreign investors is very
complex, and our indicators of GVC participation and value chain
position fail to account for heterogeneity in governance patterns
and macro contexts, dimensions that are stressed in the literature
(Cattaneo et al., 2013; Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2011; Taglioni and
Winkler, 2016). To explore this heterogeneity would require more
qualitative information tracking the modalities of interactions
between local suppliers, global firms and the host country business
environments.6. Conflicts of interest
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1. The role of geographic and institutional distance
As an additional control, we test whether cultural, institutional
and geographical proximity between the country of origin and des-
tination of the investment matters to explain local sourcing.
Results are reported in the table below and confirm the original
models presented in Table 3.19
We find that firms from countries sharing a colonial relation
or the same official language with the host country buy rela-
tively more local inputs. This result outlines the importance of
cultural and institutional factors in facilitating contractual rela-
tions between buyers and suppliers and look consistent with
some literature on the role played by (low) institutional distance
as a driver of bilateral economic relations (Head, Mayer, & Ries,
2010).
Concerning the geographic distance, we find a negative coeffi-
cient with the full sample (column 1) which turns positive with
the SSA sub-sample (column 2), confirming that more linkages
are established when geographic is larger due to an increase in
the communication costs with the home country (Rodriguez-
Clare, 1996). The negative coefficient can be explained by the fact
that foreign investors in Vietnam are mostly from Asian countries
(such as China and Japan).19 The addition of these controls reduces the size of the sample by 10% due to
missing information about the country of origin for some of the investors.


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
BILATERAL DISTANCE COLONIAL LINK COMMON LANGUAGE
GVC PARTICIPATION 1.165*** 0.315* 0.424 1.175*** 0.320* 0.473 1.106* 0.322* 0.181
(0.160) (0.182) (1.091) (0.148) (0.182) (1.116) (0.604) (0.186) (1.055)
GVC POSITION 1.283*** 1.198*** 1.536 1.292*** 1.177*** 1.552 1.381** 1.201*** 1.391
(0.106) (0.154) (1.036) (0.094) (0.151) (1.057) (0.660) (0.158) (1.007)
AGE 0.010*** 0.020*** 0.035 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.037 0.019 0.018*** 0.039
(0.003) (0.005) (0.029) (0.002) (0.005) (0.029) (0.012) (0.005) (0.029)
FOREIGN
OWNERSHIP
0.087*** 0.077*** 0.157** 0.087*** 0.076*** 0.153* 0.085*** 0.077*** 0.160**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.079) (0.004) (0.004) (0.079) (0.032) (0.004) (0.079)
SIZE 0.018*** 0.027*** 0.052*** 0.018*** 0.026*** 0.052** 0.018*** 0.025*** 0.055***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.020) (0.001) (0.002) (0.021) (0.006) (0.002) (0.020)
LABOR
PRODUCTIVITY
0.006*** 0.011*** 0.025** 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.025** 0.005 0.010*** 0.026**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.000) (0.001) (0.011) (0.006) (0.001) (0.010)
EXPORT 0.021*** 0.050*** 0.080 0.021*** 0.049*** 0.078 0.030 0.051*** 0.082
(0.005) (0.012) (0.054) (0.005) (0.011) (0.054) (0.019) (0.012) (0.056)
GREENFIELD 0.005 0.012*** 0.010 0.005 0.014*** 0.009 0.013 0.011** 0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.072) (0.004) (0.004) (0.072) (0.023) (0.004) (0.072)
MARKET SEEKING 0.013*** 0.038*** 0.062** 0.014*** 0.038*** 0.062** 0.012 0.038*** 0.068**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.029) (0.003) (0.001) (0.029) (0.017) (0.001) (0.030)
LOCAL SOURCING 0.398** 0.400** 0.401**
(0.180) (0.177) (0.181)
LOCAL SOURCING2 0.434** 0.435** 0.443**
(0.193) (0.190) (0.194)
BILATERAL DISTANCE 0.013*** 0.024*** 0.086
(0.001) (0.004) (0.055)
COLONIAL LINK 0.025*** 0.018** 0.201
(0.008) (0.008) (0.141)




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country Fixed
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of
observations
1499 909 851 1499 909 851 1499 909 851
Notes: Columns 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 report the marginal coefficients of Eq. (3), obtained with a Tobit Estimator. The dependent variable is the share of inputs sourced
domestically by foreign investors (LOCAL SOURCING). Columns 3, 6 and 9 report the marginal coefficient of probit models in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal
to 1 if the foreign investor provided any form of support (ANY SUPPORT), and 0 otherwise. Results reported in columns 1, 4 and 7 refer to the full sample; results in columns 2,
5 and 8 refer to the sub-sample of SSA countries. The definitions of all the explanatory variables are provided in Appendix Table A2. Robust standard errors, clustered by
investment destination country-industry pair, are reported in parentheses * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01.
Table A1



















Burkina Faso 15 (0.8) 4 (26.7) 1 (6.7) 1 (6.7) 3 (20.0) 4 (26.7) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (13.3)
Burundi 13 (0.7) 5 (38.5) 0 (0.0) 1 (7.7) 5 (38.5) 1 (7.7) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (7.7)
Cameroon 39 (2.0) 10 (25.6) 0 (0.0) 7 (17.9) 9 (23.1) 6 (15.4) 2 (5.1) 1 (2.6) 4 (10.3)
Cape Verde 22 (1.1) 5 (22.7) 3 (13.6) 3 (13.6) 8 (36.4) 2 (9.1) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (4.5)
Ethiopia 83 (4.3) 15 (18.1) 13 (15.7) 10 (12.0) 24 (28.9) 10 (12.1) 6 (7.2) 0 (0.0) 5 (6.0)
Ghana 93 (4.9) 11 (11.8) 3 (3.2) 12 (12.9) 40 (43.0) 19 (20.4) 4 (4.30) 0 (0.0) 4 (4.3)
Kenya 194 (10.1) 44 (22.7) 25 (12.9) 12 (6.2) 65 (33.5) 24 (12.4) 9 (4.6) 6 (3.1) 9 (4.6)
Lesotho 48 (2.5) 3 (6.2) 35 (72.9) 2 (4.2) 5 (10.4) 0 (0.0) 2 (4.2) 0 (0.0) 1 (2.1)
Madagascar 47 (2.4) 6 (12.8) 27 (57.4) 2 (4.3) 9 (19.1) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (2.1) 2 (4.3)
Malawi 20 (1.0) 1 (5.0) 1 (5.0) 1 (5.0) 8 (40.0) 5 (25.0) 1 (5.0) 1 (5.0) 2 (10.0)
Mali 30 (1.6) 4 (13.3) 3 (10.0) 0 (0.0) 13 (43.3) 5 (16.7) 4 (13.3) 0 (0.0) 1 (3.3)
Mozambique 66 (3.4) 13 (19.7) 7 (10.6) 7 (16.7) 11 (28.8) 19 (28.8) 6 (9.1) 0 (0.0) 3 (4.5)
Niger 9 (0.5) 2 (22.2) 0 (0.0) 1 (11.1) 3 (33.3) 1 (11.1) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (22.2)
Nigeria 108 (5.6) 20 (18.5) 11 (10.2) 7 (6.5) 43 (39.8) 14 (13.0) 7 (6.5) 4 (3.7) 2 (1.8)
Rwanda 24 (1.2) 10 (41.7) 2 (8.3) 0 (0.0) 6 (25.0) 3 (12.5) 1 (4.2) 0 (0.0) 2 (8.3)
Senegal 30 (1.6) 6 (20.0) 3 (10.0) 4 (13.3) 11 (36.7) 5 (16.7) 0 (0.0) 1 (3.3) 0 (0.0)
Tanzania 91 (4.7) 19 (20.9) 9 (9.9) 15 (16.5) 16 (17.6) 13 (14.3) 7 (7.7) 2 (2.2) 10 (11.0)
Uganda 137 (7.1) 43 (31.4) 8 (5.8) 14 (10.2) 46 (33.6) 13 (9.5) 5 (3.6) 3 (2.2) 5 (3.6)
Vietnam 805 (42.0) 49 (6.1) 162 (20.1) 81 (10.1) 133 (16.5) 89 (11.1) 129 (16.0) 53 (6.6) 109 (13.5)
Zambia 41 (2.1) 12 (29.3) 2 (4.9) 4 (9.7) 11 (26.8) 9 (21.9) 1 (2.4) 0 (0.0) 2 (4.9)
Total 1915 (100) 282 (14.7) 315 (16.4) 184 (9.6) 469 (24.5) 242 (12.6) 184 (9.6) 72 (3.8) 167 (8.7)
In parenthesis in the first column % of investments received by each country; in the other columns % of investments received by each sector in the country.
Sources: AIS and VI.
Table A2
List of variables, definition, sources, and summary statistics.
Variable Definition Source Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. # of observations
LOCAL SOURCING Share of inputs sourced domestically by
foreign investors
AIS and VIS 0.20 0.27 0.00 1.00 1655
ANY SUPPORT Dummy equal to one if the foreign investor
provided any form of support to local suppliers,
and zero otherwise
AIS and VIS 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 978
TECHNICAL SUPPORT Dummy equal to one if the foreign investor
provided support for upgrading of product
quality and of production process, technology
transfer and training to local suppliers, and
zero otherwise
AIS and VIS 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 978
GVC PARTICIPATION GVC participation index (Koopman et al., 2011) EORA MRIO 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.13 1655
GVC POSITION GVC position index (Koopman et al., 2011) EORA MRIO 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.03 1655
AGE Logarithm of the number of years since the first
investment
AIS and VIS 2.43 0.74 0.00 4.72 1655
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP Share of foreign ownership AIS and VIS 0.89 0.23 0.00 1.00 1655
SIZE Logarithm of the number of employees AIS and VIS 5.09 1.40 0.00 9.83 1655
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY Logarithm of the ratio of sales per employee AIS and VIS 10.16 1.60 0.38 20.88 1655
EXPORT Dummy equal to one if the foreign investor
exports, and zero otherwise
AIS and VIS 0.68 0.46 0.00 1.00 1655
GREENFIELD Dummy equal to one for greenfield investment,
and zero for the other entry modes
AIS and VIS 0.87 0.34 0.00 1.00 1655
MARKET SEEKING Dummy equal to one if the investment is
market seeking, and zero otherwise
AIS and VIS 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 1655
RULE LAW Rule of Law Index (it ranges from 2.5 to 2.5) World Governance
Indicators
0.57 0.28 1.19 0.42 1655
EDUCATION Education expenditures, in percent of total
government expenditure
World Bank 19.88 3.75 9.38 26.30 1593
BILATERAL DISTANCE Log of distance (km) between capitals of origin
and destination countries
CEPII 8.24 0.85 3.17 9.72 1499
COLONIAL LINK Dummy equal to 1 if origin and destination
countries were ever in a colonial relationship,
and zero otherwise
CEPII 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 1499
COMMON LANGUAGE Dummy equal to 1 in case of common official
language, and zero otherwise
CEPII 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 1499
FVA Foreign value added in sector j and country n,
divided by total country exports.
EORA MRIO 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.13 1655
IVA Indirect domestic value added in sector j and
country n, divided by total country exports.
EORA MRIO 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 1655
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Table A3
Downstream and upstream GVC participation.
Dependent variable LOCAL SOURCING ANY SUPPORT
Sample SSA & Vietnam SSA SSA & Vietnam
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FVA 2.363*** 0.590** 1.675
(0.216) (0.271) (2.062)
IVA 2.452*** 0.611* 1.518
(0.412) (0.328) (2.145)
GVC POSITION 2.525*** 0.003 1.382*** 0.760*** 2.871 1.105*
(0.172) (0.037) (0.172) (0.135) (2.004) (0.642)
AGE 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.039 0.039
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.033) (0.033)
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.125 0.126
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.080) (0.080)
SIZE 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.048** 0.048**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.023) (0.023)
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.027** 0.027**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.012)
EXPORT 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.068 0.068
(0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.053) (0.053)
GREENFIELD 0.005 0.005 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014 0.014
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.047) (0.047)
MARKET SEEKING 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.097*** 0.097***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.027) (0.027)
LOCAL SOURCING 0.366** 0.365**
(0.186) (0.186)
LOCAL SOURCING2 0.398** 0.397**
(0.198) (0.198)
Origin Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1655 1655 923 923 978 978
Notes: Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 report the marginal coefficients of Eq. (3), obtained with a Tobit Estimator. The dependent variable is the share of inputs sourced domestically by
foreign investors (LOCAL SOURCING). Columns 5 and 6 report the marginal coefficient of probit models in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the foreign
investor provided any form of support (ANY SUPPORT), and 0 otherwise. Results reported in columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 refer to the full sample; results in columns 3 and 4 refer to
the sub-sample of SSA countries. The definitions of all the explanatory variables are provided in Appendix Table A2. Robust standard errors, clustered by investment
destination country-industry pair, are reported in parentheses * < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01.
Table A4
Probit model on SSA sub-sample.
Dependent variable ANY SUPPORT
Sample SSA & Vietnam SSA
(1) (2)
GVC PARTICIPATION 0.800 1.707
(1.051) (1.344)














MARKET SEEKING 0.097*** 0.122**
(0.027) (0.048)
LOCAL SOURCING 0.365** 0.126
(0.186) (0.335)
LOCAL SOURCING2 0.397** 0.139
(0.198) (0.298)
Origin Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Host Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Number of observations 978 383
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the marginal coefficient of probit models in which the dependent variable is the dummy equal to 1 if the foreign investor provided any form of
support, and zero otherwise. Results reported in column 1 refer to the full sample; results in column 2 refer to the sub-sample of SSA countries. The definitions of all the
explanatory variables are provided in Appendix Table A2. Robust standard errors, clustered by investment destination country-industry pair, are reported in parentheses
* < 0.1, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01.
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Other Manufacturing
Fig. A1. GVC participation at sector level (2010) Notes: The dotted lines represent the average value in developing countries, defined by the World Bank as low income and























































TZA VNM ETH MOZ KEN NGA
Other Manufacturing
Fig. A2. GVC position at sector level (2010). The dotted lines represent the average value in developing countries, defined by the World Bank as low income and the lower-
middle income countries. Source: Authors’ elaborations based on the Eora Multi Region Input-Output database.
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the charts report the coefficients of the variables of GVC participation (left panel) and
ropping one country at the time, as listed on the horizon.
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